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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

ington, and the fact that plaintiff corporation is decidedly not within
the confines of the latter state, nor so close as to commingle interstate
and intrastate commerce, sharply calls attention to the basic idea of
the case, i.e., interstate commerce.
THOMAS W. HAYDEN

Constitutional Law; Fourteenth Amendment; Discriminating Legislation; Classification
A state statute requiring certain associations to file a copy of their
constitution, membership oath together with a list of members, and
providing for a penalty to its members for not complying, is held not
to deny the due process clause of the United States Constitution, in a
recent case of People of State of New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman et al. Decided November 19, 1928. A state legislature may
also discriminate against a particular class from which evil sought to
be remedied is mainly to be feared. A statute requiring oath-bound associations to file their constitution, by-laws, oath, and list of its members which exempted labor unions and certain lodges, was held not
to deny equal protection as discriminating against the Ku Klux Klan,
because it is based on reasonable classification.
The relative, Bryant, who was held in custody to answer a charge
of violating this statute of New York brought a proceeding in habeas
corpus in a court of that state to obtain his discharge on the ground,
as was stated in the petition, that the warrant under which he was
arrested and detained was issued without any jurisdiction, in that the
statute which he was charged with violating was unconstitutional, because repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
which declares:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person, life, liberty, or property, without process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
There are various privileges and immunities which under our dual
system of government belong to citizens of the United States solely
by reason of such citizenship. It is against their abridgment by state
laws that the privilege and immunity clause in the Fourteenth Amendment is directed. But no such privilege or immunity is in question
here. If to be, and remain a member of a secret, oath-bound association
within a state be a privilege arising out of citizenship at all, it is an
incident of state rather than United States citizenship; and such protection as is thrown about it by the constitution is in no wise affected
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by its possessor being a citizen of the United States. Thus there is
no basis here for invoking the privilege and immunity clause.'
The main contention made under the equal protection clause is
that the statute discriminates against the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
and other associations in-that it excepts from its requirements several
associations having oath-bound membership, such as labor unions, the
Masonic fraternity, -the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, the Grand
Army of the Republic, and the Knights of Columbus-all named in
another statute, which provides for their incorporation and requires the
names of their officers as elected from time to time to be reported to
the secretary of state.
Patsone vs. Pennsylvania2 holds in part that the "discrimination undoubtedly presents a more difficult question. But we start with the
general consideration that a state may classify with reference to the evil
to be prevented, and that if the class discriminated against is or reasonably might be considered to define those from whom the evil mainly is
to be feared, it may properly be picked out. A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The question is a practical one, dependent
upon experience. The demand for symmetry ignores -the specific difference that experience is supposed to have shown to mark the class. It
is not enough to invalidate the law that others may do the same thing
and go unpunished, if, as a matter of fact it is found that the danger
3
is characteristic of the class named."Y
The courts recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited
and reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a
difference between the two classes of associations shown by experience
and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part
of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purposes and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public
welfare, and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the
other class 4 in contrarity to the Ku Klux Klan. It is a ilatter of common knowledge that this organization functions largely at night, its
members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to
strike terror into the minds of the people.
The Ku Klux Klan was a revival of an earlier time, with additional
features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of
other periods; that its membership was limited to nativeborn, gentile,
protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed creed it
proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Con'Slaughterhouse cases 16 Wall. 36, 77 et seq.
2232 U.S. 138.
'Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,go.
42o6 N.Y. 533.
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stitution of the United States, in another exacted of its members an
oath to shield and preserve white supremacy, and in still another declared any person actively opposing its principles to be a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal
of our national commonwealth; that it was conducting a crusade against
Catholics, Jews, and negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race
prejudice; that it was striving for political power, and assuming a
sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state,- and national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands the
punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes.
It is plain that the action of the courts below in holding that there
was a real and substantial basis for the distinction made between the
two sets of associations or orders was right and should not be disturbed.
Criticism is made of the classification on the further ground that the
regulation is confined to associations having a membership of twenty
or more persons. Classification based on numbers is not necessarily unreasonable. There are many instances in which it has been sustained.
It is not unreasonable in this instance. With good reason the legislature may have thought that an association of less than twenty persons
would have only a negligible influence, and be without the capacity
for harm that would make regulation needful.
CHAS. S. SHANE

Fraud; State Law Creating Presumption of, as to every Insolvency;
Due Process
The United States Supreme Court, in the recent case of Manley v.
State of Georgia, 49 S.Ct. 215, had occasion again to defend the
Fourteenth Amendment. The difficulty arose over the interpretation
of section 28, art. 20 of the State Banking Act of I919 (Acts Ga.
1919, p. 219) which is worded:
Every insolvency of a bank shall be deemed fraudulent, and the
president and directors shall be severally punished by imprisonment
and labor in the penitentiary for not less than one (i) year nor longer
than ten (io) years; provided, that the defendant in a case arising under this section, may repel .the presumption of fraud by -showing that
the affairs of the bank have been fairly and legally administered, and
generally, with the same care and diligence that agents receiving a commission for their services are required and bound by law to observe;
and upon such showing the jury shall acquit the prisoner.
This statute became of peculiar significance because of the adoption
of a new definition of insolvency in that year:
A bank shall be deemed to be insolvent, first, when it cannot meet
its liabilities as they become due in the regular course of business;

